Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Louise A. Symes v. Merlin David Symes : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Emilie Bean; Bean & Smedley; Attorneys for Appellant.
Steven C. Tycksen; Zoll, Tycksen & Hall; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Symes v. Symes, No. 990234 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2096

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

<?ww
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LOUISE A. SYMES,
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.

CaseNo.990234-CA
MERLIN DAVID SYMES,
Priority 15
Respondent/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
JUDGE DARWIN C. HANSEN

EMILIE A. BEAN (6178)
BEAN & SMEDLEY
190 South Fort Lane Suite # 2
Layton, UT 84041
(801) 544-4221

STEVEN C. TYCKSEN
ZOLL, TYCKSEN & HALL
P.O. Box 590
Sandy, UT 84091-0590
(801) 572-2700

Attorney for Petitioner/
Appellee

Attorneys for Respondent/
Appellant
Mn Court of Appeals

4uim PWasandre
"lerk of the Court

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LOUISE A. SYMES,
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.
CaseNo.990234-CA
MERLIN DAVID SYMES,
Priority 15
Respondent/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
JUDGE DARWIN C. HANSEN

EMILIE A. BEAN (6178)
BEAN & SMEDLEY
190 South Fort Lane Suite # 2
Layton, UT 84041
(801) 544-4221

STEVEN C. TYCKSEN
ZOLL, TYCKSEN & HALL
P.O. Box 590
Sandy, UT 84091-0590
(801) 572-2700

Attorney for Petitioner/
Appellee

Attorneys for Respondent/
Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents

i

Table of Authorities

ii

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

1

Statement of Jurisdiction

1

Statement of Issues Presented

2

Statement of the Case

3

A. Nature of the Case

3

B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

3

C. Statement of Facts

4

Summary of Argument

6

Argument

7

I.

The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the appreciation on the
Bear Lake cabin to be marital property
7

II.

The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning to Merlin the
premarital value of the cabin, and declining to apportion to Merlin as separate
property the appreciation accumulated during the marriage
14

HI.

The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law in declining to
divide the costs of valuing the property between the parties
16

IV.

The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying post-trial motions to
hear additional evidence when such complaint was not raised at trial
17

Conclusion

18

Appendix.
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
UTAH STATUTES AND RULES
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)

1

CASES CITED
Utah Supreme Court
Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 1966)

18

Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1973)

11

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980)

16

Peay v. Peay. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980)

18

Bushell v. Bushell 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982)

14

Workman v. Workman. 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982)

8

Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d431 (Utah 1982)

11

Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d468 (Utah 1984)

11

Puseyv.Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986)

14

Katz v.Pierce. 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986)

17

Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987)

7,8

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer. 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987)
Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988)
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988)
Noble v. Noble. 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988)

ii

12,14,15
2,11
2,9,14
14

Utah Court of Appeals
Bailey v. Bailey. 745 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1987)

11

Naranio v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988)

11

Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990)

2,16

Burt v.Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990)

11

Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990)

12

Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991)

8

Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992)

8

Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993)

iii

13

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following are the constitutional and statutory provisions which are addressed in
this appeal:
§30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). "When a decree of divorce is
rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
debts or obligations, and parties.55

STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
l§78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996).

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

Did the Court abuse its discretion in finding the appreciation on the Bear

Lake cabin to be marital property?

cc

Marital property encompasses all of the assets of every

nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.55
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1978 (Utah 1988).
II.

Did the Court abuse its discretion by apportioning to Merlin the premarital

value of the Bear Lake Cabin and declining to apportion to Merlin as separate property the
appreciation on the cabin accumulated during the parties5 28-year marriage? The
appreciation on the cabin came as a result of 28 years of substantial additions and
improvements to which both parties contributed. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d
304 (Utah 1988).
HI.

Did the Court abuse its discretion by not dividing the costs of the appraisals

incurred solely by the appellant? Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990)
stands for the proposition that, "neither land surveys nor appraisal fees, incurred in
preparation for litigation, are recoverable as costs.55 Id. at 684.
IV.

Did the Court abuse its discretion in denying appellant's post trial motions

to take additional evidence on the monies received from the sale of the parties5 St. George
property? Appellant's post-trial motions were properly denied where all the
documentation he requested was solely within Merlin5s possession and could have easily
been raised by Merlin at trial.

2

STATEMENT O F T H E CASE

A. Nature of the Case. This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce in the Second
District Court, Davis County, Layton Department in which the Honorable Darwin C.
Hansen divided both premarital and marital property. The court assessed a value to the
respondent's premarital interest in a summer home on Bear Lake and considered the
remainder of the increase in equity of the property as a marital asset. The court then
awarded the respondent the Bear Lake home and property but offset the petitioner's
marital interest in the property by awarding her other interests. Respondent also appeals
from the courts denial of apportionment of appraisal costs and the court's denial of a post
trial motion to take additional evidence.
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Trial was held in the above
matter on October 8 th and 9 th , 1998 at the Layton District Court, die Honorable Darwin
C. Hansen presiding. Thereafter, the court issued a written Memorandum Decision on
October 20, 1998. The respondent filed two post-trial motions, first, a Motion to Assess
Costs on November 18, 1998, and, second, a Motion to Reconsider Court Ruling and/or
Re-Open Trial to Take Additional Testimony and Evidence. The court denied the
respondent's post-trial motions on December 16, 1998. The Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were signed by Judge Hansen on February 22,
1999, at a supplementary hearing on the property division. The respondent appealed.
3

C. Statement of Facts.
1. The parties were married on or about the 21st day of October, 1969. TT. Vol.
I, p. 17, L. 1-4.
2. The parties separated on or about the 4th day of November, 1997. TT. Vol. I,
p. 25, L. 10-13.
3. The parties have no children together, but each party has several children from
prior marriages. TT. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 3-17.
4. At the time of the parties5 marriage, Louise's five minor children and Merlin's
four children resided with the parties at the marital residence. TT. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 3-17.
5. At nearly every job that Merlin held, for almost 28 years, Louise was also
employed alongside Merlin, because "he asked her to do so because he needed her help and
support.55 TT. Vol. I, p. 19.
6. At the time of the parties5 marriage, Merlin was the record owner of two parcels
of land at Bear Lake. An "A55 frame cabin was constructed on one of these parcels. TT.
Vol. I, p. 43 L. 5-8.
7. During the course of this 28 year marriage, various additions and improvements
to the original CCA55 frame cabin were made by the parties, including the addition of three
bedrooms, a new roof, a garage, a gate and posts, several turrets, and a sewer line. TT.
Vol. 1, p. 46-50 generally.
8. While Merlin completed the majority of the heavy labor associated with the
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additions and improvements to the cabin, Louise was right by his side, doing everything
she could to maintain the grounds and the cabin itself. TT. Vol. 1, p. 46-50 generally.
9. While title to the cabin remained in Merlin's name, any expenses associated with
the cabin (including utilities and property taxes) were paid for out of marital funds. TT.
Vol. I, p. 47, L. 18-25.
10. Insurance on this cabin was also maintained in the name of Merlin and Louise
Symes. TT. Vol. H, p. 364, L. 5-15.
11. At trial, the trial court awarded Merlin his premarital interest in the Bear Lake
cabin and found that the appreciation which resulted from the many additions to the cabin
to be marital property. R. 103.
12. The trial court ultimately awarded Merlin the Bear Lake cabin, but offset
Louise's interest in the appreciation accumulated during the parties' 28-year marriage, by
awarding her other interests. R. 104.

5

SUMMARY O F A R G U M E N T
The trial court has broad discretion in reaching an equitable distribution of the
parties marital assets and can take into consideration the premarital estates of either party as
it relates to the overall division and to the extent that the court finds that there has been
efforts on the part of the other party toward the enhancement, maintenance and protection
of the property. The court was not required to apportion the premarital value as
advocated by the respondent particularly where the court can determine that the other
spouse has enhanced the value of the property during the course of the marriage and where
the evidence was clear that the original CCA55 frame cabin had be remodeled and additions
added repeatedly during the course of the marriage. The court is further not required to
believe the testimony of the respondent's children over the testimony of the petitioner
regarding her understanding of the source of funds for the additions, utilities, insurance
and maintenance.
The court does have a right to 2^sess costs but the Court of Appeals has specifically
stated that neither the cost of land surveys nor appraisals incurred in preparation for
litigation are recoverable costs.
The trial court, after a second, unscheduled day of trial, can in its discretion deny the
motion of the respondent to hear additional evidence particularly where the complaint of
the respondent regarding the claimed information was not raised at trial. In actuality the
respondent had sufficient notice of all issues particularly as they were raised in the discovery

6

which answers were not provided to the petitioner until halfway through the first day of
trial. The issues regarding the funds were related to a bank account in the respondents
name only where the parties did not have a joint marital account and therefore the
information was not in the control of the petitioner. If anyone has a complaint about the
inability to prepare for trial testimony, it is the petitioner who had to prepare her case
without the benefit of the respondent's overdue answers to discovery.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION
IN FINDING THAT THE APPRECIATION O N
PREMARITAL PROPERTY OF THE RESPONDENT WAS A
MARITAL ASSET U N D E R THE FACTS IN THIS CASE.
The trial court was well within its discretion in finding the appreciation on the Bear
Lake cabin to be a marital asset. The seminal case on this issue is Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d
133 (Utah 1987). The Court set forth the general rule that, cc[p]remarital property, gifts,
and inheritances may be viewed as separate property, and in appropriate circumstances,
equity will require that each party retain the separate property brought to the marriage.
However, the rule is not invariable.55 Id. at 135. The Court set forth thirteen (13) factors
that the trial court should consider in fashioning an equitable property division.55 Id.
These factors are:
[T]he amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the property was
acquired before or during the marriage; the source of the property; the
health of the parties; the parties5 standard of living, respective financial
conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the duration of the marriage; the
children of the marriage; the parties5 ages at time of marriage and of divorce;
7

what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary relationship the
property division has with the amount of alimony and child support to be
awarded. Id.
The Court further stated that of specific concern is ccwhether one spouse has made
any contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether
the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.55 IdL In Burke,
the increase in land value came solely from inflation, whereas in the present case, the
increase in land value came from substantial improvements to the land, specifically
numerous additions to the original CCA55 frame cabin, which occurred repeatedly during this
20-year marriage.
The Burke court gave further guidance to trial courts in determining an equitable
division of property:
In the exercise of their discretion, trial courts need to be guided by the
general purpose to be achieved by a property division, which is to allocate
the property in a manner which best serves the needs of the parties and best
permits them to pursue their separate lives. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court concluded in Burke that Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5
confers ccbroad discretion upon trial courts in the division of property, regardless of its
source or time of acquisition.55 IcL at 134-35; Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App.
1991) cert, denied^ 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). Further, "in appropriate circumstances,
one spouse may be awarded property which the other spouse brought in to the marriage.55
Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992); Workman v. Workman. 652 P.2d 931,
933 (Utah 1982) (holding that "achieving a fair, just, and equitable result may require that
8

the trial court exercise its discretion to award one spouse the premarital property of the
other.55). Judge Hansen was cognizant of the fact that the cabin was acquired before the
marriage and awarded Merlin his premarital interest. The court however, exercised its
discretion in finding that the appreciation on the cabin was marital property.
In Mortensen, the Court consolidated the thirteen (13) factors discussed in Burke.
The Court concluded that trial court should award premarital property to the party who
brought the property into the marriage, unless:
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring
an equitable interest in i t , . . . or (2) the property has been consumed or its
identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring
spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse. IcL at 308.

The Petitioner has, by her efforts and expenses, contributed substantially to the
enhancement, maintenance, and protection of the Bear Lake property, as identified in the
trial court's findings. When the parties were first married in 1970 and Merlin brought the
cabin to the marriage, Louise testified to the nature of the land and the cabin as it was at
that time: a small "A" frame cabin which consisted of two bedrooms and two loft
bedrooms. TT. Vol. I, p. 4 3 , Line 9-13. Louise then testified that in about 1980, the
cabin has a total of seven (7) bedrooms with a garage being added. TT. Vol. I, p. 46, L.
21-23. Similarly, during the course of the marriage, a sewer line was put in which the
residents paid for, TT. Vol. I, p. 48, Line 9-12, a gate and posts were added to the
property, as well as turrets. As of 1996, the cabin has "been made to look like a castle type
9

Vol.

48, Line 20-25. At some point during the course of the marriage, a new roof

was also placed on the cabin. TT. Vol. I, p. 4 9 , 1 , 1 0 1 2 Petitioner's exhibits 2.. 3^ 4. ~,
and 13 are photographs or mc cabin taken throughout the parties5 marriage. These
p i l o t O*.
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cabin during the parties5 28-year marriage.
Louise testified that any and all monthly bills, utilities, and taxes on the cabin were
paid Inn oiili in,u it,ill 1(111 II1

II

ill I |i 4

1 I iii (',i |i I

I I

Ionise llidpal ju\

for the respective bills with her income from Social Security. TT. Vol. II, p. 325. Merlin
also testified that the insurance on the cabin had both Merlin's and Louise's names on it.
Therefore, if any damage was to occur to the cabin, any insurance payments would have

contradicted herself. When Louise was asked, cc[d]o you know for sure that marital funds
were used for the Bear Lake property,55 after a leading question was sustained, Louise
t( SUIK

L. 10-25.
During the twenty-eight years that Louise and Merlin were married^ when they and
their respective families would go to this cabs.., Louise testified to the following:
There was always lots of work to be done. I always cooked all the meals,,
washed all the dishes, cleaned the cabin, tried to make it an enjoyable
weekend for everyone. I weeded in the yard. I eventually planted flowers,
scrubs, and things in the yard to make it more beautiful. And then I took all
••1

the laundry home. The bedding and everything, the towels and all and
washed during the week while I was working. TT. Vol. I, p. 56, L. 4-11.
Judge Hansen found the above financial and labor contributions and efforts toward
improvements by Louise to be sufficient to categorize the appreciation on the cabin as
marital property.
The Court in Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) stated another
general rule: "Marital property encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by
the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.55 Id. at 1078. The
Court in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d431,432-33 (Utah 1982) also emphasized
that:
Whether a resource is subject to distribution does not turn on whether the
spouse can presendy use or control it, or on whether the resource can be
given a present dollar value. The essential criterion is whether a right to the
benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part during the marriage.

Clearly, without specifically stating as such, the trial court found that Louise accrued a
right to the cabin (the appreciation which accrued during the marriage) because of her
substantial contributions to the asset for 28 years.
The cases have consistently followed the rule of law set forth in Mortensen. In Burt
v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990) the Court held that premarital property
of a party is not beyond the coiirfs reach in an equitable property division. See Also
Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988); Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380
(Utah 1973); Bailey v. Bailey. 745 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1987); Argyle v. Argyle. 688
11

P.2d468 (Utah 1984); Ncwmcyci v. N e w m a n ' I ! *•

!

1987).

Appellant argues that the efforts Louise made to contribute to the cabin didn't rise
to a level to classify the appreciation on the cabin as marital property. This determination

App. 1990) sets forth very specifically the efforts that can be considered by the trial court
in determining a distribution of marital property. The Dunn Court refused to weigh
fn lai icia 1 coi itributions eacl: I pai tnei i nade to tl le marriage in dividing marital property. It
held that cc[s]uch an analysis ignores contributions of love, n * •• ;i-MM\ u

.. \d

companionship, which elude monetary valuation.55 IcL at 1322.
Louise testified that, at the time of the parties5 marriage, her five (5) minor children
at id

•

- •

i ] i. a i ita 1 residence ' '

>1 I,

p. 18, L. 3-17. Louise testified that she was the primary caretaker of these nine {9)
children TT, Vol. I, p. 1 8,1 , 20-21 5 and "was employed with Merlin in most, in nearly all
tlle jobs that he evei naa during the marriage,

, .

->.

±-

because he told her that cche needed [her] help in the jobs and so [she] went to support
[her] husband.53

••

- M I ouise has a teaching degree, but gave it up

in null ni ihi suppnii Hi i lui.sb.md, and to "make the mi in

IMI|;I1

"o ill. " T l "

iill l ( |i

II"11111, 1 .

23-25, p. 20, L. 1 6 . She sacrificed income, retirement, and most importantly: the
opportunity pursue her dream of teaching. Louise has no retirement available to her
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because she gave that up when she went to work at nearly every job Merlin held for twentyeight (28) years. TT. Vol. I, p. 22, L. 17-21.
Louise was an equal partner in this marriage of twenty-eight (28) years. Her many
contributions, although not of extreme monetary value, cannot be overlooked. Louise
testified that Merlin has been fired consistendy throughout the parties nearly twenty-eight
(28) year marriage "from most of his jobs, from coast to coast.55 TT. Vol. II, p. 293, L. 68. Louise was asked why she didn't apply for jobs to supplement the parties'incomes. TT.
Vol. II, p. 292, L. 9-10. Her response was: u [b]ecause I needed to be with my husband to
help him keep a job and support him in keeping employment. He always asked me to
come in and help him.55 TT. Vol. H, p. 292, L. 11-13.
A similar case to the one at hand arose in Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260
(Utah App. 1993), the Court vacated an award of a hardware store to the party who
brought the store into the marriage. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court never
"considered [appellant's] contributions in determining what financial benefits, if any,
accrued to the hardware store by virtue of her contributions, financial or otherwise, during
the period of the marriage.55 Id. at 263. The trial court made specific and adequate
findings as to the many contributions Louise made both to the marriage, and to the Bear
Lake cabin. It was therefore not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to find that the
appreciation on the cabin was a marital asset.

13

Q U r i A B L E POWERS
IN DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE PREMARITAL
VALUE OF THE BEAR LAKE CABIN AND THE APPORTIONMENT
n

T H E T R I A L C O U R T U S E D ITS E

OF THE APPRECIATION THEREON.
Under §30-3-5, Utah Cx>de Annotated (1953 as amended), the Utah Supreme
C ouit is well as the I itah < own ot Appeals lias consistently held that " there is no fixed
rule or formula for the division of property, th< fiuleomf li i side disci cti« m in p m p n t \
division, and its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion can
be demonstrated." Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 305-06 (Utah 1988); Bushell
v. BiLshclL <»•!*' I" M S'i (1 "« ill I'W '

Snnil

IIII

Is, ill Hi li

j |n Uati 1 ^>uiis <|i

IIMIII

lij'Juh

disturb a trial court's division of property in a divorce decree and will uphold a division
made in accordance with the standards we have set and in the exercise of the trial court's
discretion "except where to do so would w oii a manifest injustice or inequity.J" Noble v.
Noble. 761 V M I3f><> /Huh I'WI; (aunfnm Pusc\ v.

PLLSCV.

y

^ V V

1986). See Also Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). IMu
manifest injustice or inequity will result if the trial court's division of property is upheld.
As tin inal

HIIIIH1*

Mrmoi .unlnm J )u i .inn mi in JU s., gii jf luinlis win I tkni 1^ tin fn,d

court to insure that the division of property was equal. See generally Memorandum
Decision R. 101-108
The o\nndjii(t» n>iisnli J .it ion iui ilic: d i tl MHIH

I I I fashioning

an equitable

distribution of property is tcthat the ultimate division be equitable-that pioprrt\ ix i JII ly
divided between the parties, given their contributions during the marriage and their
14

circumstances at the time of the divorce." Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, at 1278. Louise
contributed 28 years of her life to the maintenance and enhancement of the family. As part
of her contribution, Louise maintained the marital residence as well as the parties5 cabin to
make it comfortable for everyone. Like many families, Merlin contributed his time and
energy to building the additions to the cabin and Louise contributed her time and energy
to the enhancement of the cabin, which included cooking, cleaning, laundry, yard work,
and support and encouragement to Merlin.
Appellant argues that the trial court failed to apportion to Merlin his premarital
interest in the Bear Lake cabin. However, as the courfs Memorandum Decision indicates,
Merlin was awarded his premarital interest in the cabin of $12,000. The trial court heard
arguments from both parties on what they believed the value of the cabin was at the time
of the marriage. However, the trial court rejected appellee's argument that the original
value of the cabin should be based on the valuation of the cabin for property tax purposes.
The trial court also rejected appellant's argument that the value at the time of the parties5
marriage is irrelevant. The trial court determined the current value of the cabin based on
the following:
If the adjacent lot, which is the same size as the cabin lot was worth $5,000
when initially sold [in 1974] and is now worth $50,000, then by negative
extrapolation, the cabin and its lot which is now worth $119,000 would have
been valued at approximately $12,000 at the time of the parties5 marriage.
R. 104.
The trial court exercised its discretion in determining the value of the cabin before the

15

n-MJiU; • 'Tlic
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inurl ,u ni.illy deeemnnnl fix1
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based solely upon the testimony of appellant5s appraiser. Appellee is at a loss to see how
appellant can argue the trial court stated the cabin was entirely marital property. Clearly,
J iuyc i MUM

*u

*
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•

•

.v -

determined by the court) at the time of the marriage. The court then determined the
appreciation which accrued during the marriage to be marital property.

1 t±E COURT DID N O T ERR BY REFUSING
TO DIVIDE THE COST OF APPRAISALS
OBTAINED BY THE RESPONDENT.

The petitioner is somewhat confused by this issue. Not only is the trial court, in its
cisv'T w

ie

respondent specifically states that the trial court cannot assess appraisal costs. In Morgan v.
Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 687, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically stated, '"Furthermore,
our appellate courts make a distinction between legitimate and taxable 'Yosts11 and it her
"expenses "

ioi i, which ma y be ever so necessary , but are not taxable as costs.1 for

instance, neither land surveys nor appraisal fees, incurred in preparation for litigation, are
recoverable as costs.55 Id. at 684 (quoting Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 77 1, 7 74 ) All of
the appraisals uUain-vl h\ (It,' respondnil wvi" m ptquufifiii Un tn il ,md, tlirnfm,, , the
court could not even consider the request made by the respondent for division of these
expenses as costs apportionable by the court. No finding by the court is necessary when
i*>

the issue is a matter of law as set forth by a higher court.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT MAY DENY POST TRIAL MOTIONS
W H E N THE COURT, IN ITS DISCRETION, BELIEVES
N O ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY,
At the close of the two-day trial, appellant made a motion to re-consider the trial
court's ruling and to re-open the trial to take additional testimony and evidence. As one of
the reasons for this motion, Appellant alleges that the documentation regarding the monies
which the parties received from the sale of the St. George property were solely within the
control of Appellee.
The trial court5s decision not to hear additional testimony is wholly within the trial
court's discretion and will not be overturned unless a clear abuse of discretion has occurred.
Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). While it is true that appellant's motion was
filed before the entry of the final decree, it is not true that nothing in the pre-trial discovery
or pleadings could have alerted appellant to the fact that large sums of money received and
spent during the marriage would be at issue at trial.
The trial court decided to deny appellant's motion to hear additional evidence,
particularly because this information could have easily been raised at trial. Appellant did
have sufficient notice of each and every issue Louise intended to raise at trial. These issues
were raised in Louises5 Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
Appellant failed to answer these requests in a timely manner, and in fact only provided
17

them t :: 1 01 ii.se ha If * ;ray t 1 i i 01 igl 11 1 le fit st d; ly of t t I i! I I * > oil, IL , p 103. I 5 2.2.
Appellant also alleges that he could not have anticipated information on the monies
received from the sale of the parties5 St. George property would be needed at trial,
particularly where he alleges all the records pertaining to this issue were wholly witnin i; \c
coin ii ill ot I

,OUIM

I lir. is Mil ni iph in if li II*

In 11* ( Mnlin ti • l it in] at tri il tli.il ,i |i in it h nils

account did not exist. He further testified that the funds from the sale of the St. George
property was deposited into his separate account. TT. Vol. II, p. 466. Therefore^ since
this claimed infbrmatioi i. wa si i 11 aised. at ti iai, ai id \\ as ii i fact. ii i Mei lit i s possessioi i. ti le
entire time, Appellant's argument is without merit.
As the Supreme Court of Utah stated in Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah
1980):
CC

[1J1 the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a
motion for reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself,. . .
[i]n order to avoid such a state of indecision for both the judge and the
parties, practical expediency demands that there be some finality to the
actions of the court; and he should not be in the position of having the
further duty of acting as a court of review upon his own ruling.55 Id. at 843
(quoting Drurv v. Lunceford. 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 1966)).

CONCLUSION
The trial court was well within its discretion in determining that the appreciation on
the Bear Lake cabin was marital property. Judge Hansen found that Louise made

during the parties5 28-year marriage. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

apportioning to Merlin the premarital value of the cabin and ultimately awarding to Merlin
the entire cabin with an offset to Louise (in the form of other interests) of her marital
interest in the cabin. The trial court also acted within its discretion by not dividing the
costs of the appraisals which were solely incurred by Merlin and in denying Merlin's posttrial motions to take additional evidence.
DATED this /ff^day of October, 1999.

7^7<^1WS

EMILIE A. BEAN
Bean & Smedley
Attorney for Appellee
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i t: t
Q

It goes to the issue

i K bi 1 >] « >s) .
:'o;. may proceed.

The replacing of that really does not

..
(MS. BEAN)

There are no children borne as issue

i/

of this marriage, correct?
A

That's true.

Q

And you had five minor children prior to this

marriage?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And Mr. Symes had four children who were living

with you, correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

Where was the fourth child?

A

The fourth child was already previously married.

Q

How old were your children at the time of the

marriage?
A

My oldest child was fifteen and the youngest was

Q

And how old were Mr. Symesf children?

A

The ones that lived with us would have been

six.

seventeen down to about fourteen.
Q

And who was the primary caretaker of these

children?
A

I cared for all their needs; cooked their meals,

washed their clothes, sent them to schoolQ

Okay.

I did for them.

Were you employed during the course of the

marriage?
A

Yes, I was, with my husband.

Q

By doing what?

18

A

I was employed by European Health Spa during the

years in Florida, I was employed by Golden Villa Spa in
Salt Lake.

I was employed for a brief time by his sister

when we entered the shop.
MR. TYCKSEN:
this testimony.

Your Honor, my client can't hear

She needs to speak louder.

THE COURT:

Just speak up a little.

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

I was employed by European

Health Spas when we lived in Florida.

I was employed by

his sister when we lived in Salt Lake, briefly at a dress
shop called Marie's.

I was employed by Golden Villa Spa

when Merlin worked there.

I was employed by Golden Villa

which took over Johnny Johnson's spas in Oregon when we
lived there and then I was employed with Merlin in most, in
nearly all the jobs that he ever had during the marriage.
I was also employed by Spa Lady in our years ih California.
I was also employed by Mountain Coin where he worked in
Salt Lake.
Q

(BY MS. BEAN) These are the same employers as Mr.

Symes?
A

Yes, they were.

Q

Why?

A

Mr. Symes said that he needed my help in the jobs

and so I went to support my husband.

I had an education to

teach but I gave that up in order to support him and make

19

the marriage work,
Q

Okay.

Did you have personal employment goals?

A

Yes, I did.

I planned to teach.

fine record with my education.
that.

I had a very

I planned to carry on with

I could have built a good retirement had I not

sacrificed it.
Q

Do you recall the most that you made per hour at

any of these
A
them.

—

I started out at minimum wage on everyone of
And then I was kept on minimum wage.

The bulk of

the larger amounts went into my husband's account and I
just basically supported him and started at minimum wage.
And then when I became a manager in California when we
worked for Spa Lady I was making more money.

I would have

made the most money I've probably made during the marriage
then.

I would have been paid on commission basis according

to what I sold.
Q

Okay.

A

I last worked in ^92.

Q

Okay.

A

I suffered a very severely broken leg and ankle

and ribs.

When did you last work?

Why did you quit?

I was in a wheelchair.

I was unable to walk for

nine months and completely in the care of a caring
relative.
Q

Who was that caring relative?

20

1

A

Yes, I do-

2

Q

And what is your current condition on those?

3

A

My health has deteriorated greatly in the last

4

twenty-eight years, particularly in the last five and

5

especially in the last two,

6

many gastrointestinal problems.

I have colon problems; a

7

spastic colon, irritable bowel-

I suffer from interstitial

8

cystitis of the bladder which is a most painful condition

9

and there is no cure for it.

I have stomach ulcers.

I have

I also suffered a heart

10

attack in the past and I have a rapid and irregular heart

11

beat now, yes, I do.

12

Q

Okay. And is your condition agitated by stress?

13

A

Yes. My doctors tell me it's all stress

14

oriented.

15

Q

Okay.

16

A

Only Medicare and AARP.

17

Q

Okay.

18

A

No, I do not.

19

Q

Why not?

20

A

Because I was working at a job to support my

21

Do you have any medical insurance?

Do you have any retirement income?

husband where there was no retirement income available.

22

Q

Okay.

You've asked for alimony, correct?

23

A

Yes, I have.

24

Q

Why?

25

A

Because the church has had to help me with my
22

1

Judge Robert Hilder dated April 24, 1998.

2

order, counsel, that you are referring to?

3

MR, TYCKSEN:

4

THE COURT: All right.

Is that the

That's the order,
The Court has a copy of

5

that.

I read it and we'll feel leave to refer to it as

6

part of this proceeding if neither counsel objects.

7
8

MR. TYCKSEN:
exhibit if you want it.

9
10
11

I have a copy of it marked as an

THE COURT:
Q

All right, thank you.

(BY MS. BEAN)

All right.

Let's back up just a

little bit. When did you and Mr. Symes (inaudible)?

12

A

November 4, 1997.

13

Q

Under what conditions did you separate?

14

A

Threats and abuse on my life and on the lives of

15

other people.

I had to leave the house.

I was told I

16

would be thrown through the front door.

17

trip to the front door yet.

18

people and his former employer and at some point I had to

19

start taking these seriously-

20

professionals before.

I hadn't had my

He made threats on judicial

I had discussed them with

21

Q

Where was Mr. Symes living at the time?

22

A

He was living at Layton, Utah, where he always

23

lived.

24

Q

25

And where did the two of you keep your personal

property at Layton (inaudible)?
25

A

The highway is right in my backyard.

Highway 89

borders my backyard.
Q

Okay.

How old are you, Louise?

A

I'm sixty-two, be sixty-three in January.

Q

Okay.

Let's move on to the Bear Lake Property.

It's your understanding that Mr. Symes originally owned
this property prior to the marriage, correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

And when, at the time of your marriage

what was the nature of the property?
A

The nature of the property, there were no grass,

no scrubs, anything put in.

It was a small "A" frame cabin

that had two bedrooms with two loft bedrooms.
Q

How many lots?

A

I thought there were two separate lots.

There

was one that was undeveloped that joins onto the Northern
side.
Q

Okay.

Where is this property located in

direction to the lake?
A

It's right on water front.

It's right on the

lake.
Q

Okay.

All right.

THE COURT:

Counsel, I'd be interested in knowing

which side of the lake?
MR. TYCKSEN:

On the East side of the lake.

43

of the cabin, it looks like there is some boat storage
underneath there, is that right?
A

Yes,

Q

And there are some boats there?

A

Yes.

There were canoes, catamarans, that type of

thing, stored under the porch.
MS. BEAN:

Okay.

Can I approach the witness,

your Honor?
THE COURT:
Q

You may.

(BY MS. BEAN)

I'm going to show you what has

been marked at petitioner's Exhibit 3, we would also ask
that the record reflect that (inaudible).

Can you identify

that picture for us, please?
A
Lake.

Yes. This is another photo of the cabin at Bear
The yard was still not developed.

Merlin is

standing out in the front yard, he's walking along.

This

was taken about 1980 after we returned from employment with
Spa Lady in California, and the stained glass windows, the
garage, and the addition is being made at that time to the
cabin.
Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Were there bedrooms added at that time?
It now has a total of seven bedrooms.

There were three additional added and a garage.
Q

All right. And that would have been prior to

1980 according to that photo?

46

We returned during tne Fall of y19 from

^

A

g

California.

£

in 1980.

So this photo was probably taken about early

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

Craig was born in *55 and Scott in A53 so they

b

would have been about 25 and 27.

7
8

How old were Mr. Symes' sons in 1980?

Q

Okay.

To your knowledge how was the addition

paid for?

9

A

I donf t know.

10

Q

Okay.

11
12

were used for the Bear Lake property?
A

13
14

Do you know for sure that marital funds

Yes.
MR. TYCKSEN:

know.

She's already testified she doesn't

I think counsel is leading the witness.

15

(All Talking)
Ifm going to sustain the objection in

16

THE COURT:

17

terms of leading the witness.

18 |
19
20
21

Q

(BY MS. BEAN)

All right.

Louise, did you ever

pay for anything?
A

Yes. We always paid the utilities and taxes. I

paid the utilities along with monthly bills at the cabin.

22

Q

When you say you paid for them?

23 J

A

Out of household money that we were to pay, our

24

money, that we were to pay our bills with.

25

at the time, too.

I was employed

Some of mine would have gone into the
47

bills that I paid.
Q

Okay.

And do you have checks to show that?

A

I did have.

Q

Where are they?

A

They were taken from my house.

Q

Okay.

In addition to the physical improvements

in the actual cabin, x^here there also improvements made by
Bear Lake Association?
A

Yes. During the course of the marriage there was

a sewer line put in and that would have been at quite a
substantial cost.

That came in during the course of the 28

years.
Q

Okay.

Do you know who did that?

Did the city or

did the residents?
A

No.

The residents had to pay for it, the

residents that owned the property.
Q

I hand you Petitioner's Exhibit 4, (inaudible)

and I'd also ask that the record reflect that Mr.
(inaudibles).
A

Yes.

at Bear Lake.

Can you identify that picture?
This is a very recent picture of the cabin
This is a lot like what it looks now.

It

had the addition of the gate and some posts and some
turrets.

It's been made to look like a castle type of

building now with the "A" frame being the old part that was
in the center section.

48

Q

Okay-

Do you know about when this photo was

taken?
A

This would have been taken probably in 1996.

This is one of our granddaughters in front, Charlena and
two of her friends as they went to the cabin.

They are

standing by the gate.
Q

And what's been added to the cabin specifically

Lnce the last photograph?
A

More turrets and more castle like equipment.

Q

Okay.

A

It had a new roof from these early pictures.

What about the roof?
The

roof was replaced with longer lasting shake shingles.
Q

Okay.

All right.

To your knowledge who paid for

these improvements?
MR. TYCKSEN:

Objection.

Foundation.

Assumes

she knows who paid for it.
THE COURT:

I'm going to sustain that objection.

But lay a better foundation and then re-ask the question.
Q

(BY MS. BEAN)

Do you know who paid for that

improvement on the roof?
A

Merlin would have paid for them.

Q

Okay.

A

No, I don't.

Q

Do you know what account that came out of?

A

No, I don't.

Do you know what funds he used?

49

Q

Why don't you know?

A

Because I never had a joint account and he was,

he usually dealt in cash and he never told me what he was
4 f doing with his money.
5

He didn't really want to tell

anybody about it.

€ j

Q

Okay.

Was any portion of this property sold

f j during the course of the marriage?
8

A

3

Yes.

The part that would, as I f m looking at the

photo, that would be on the left.

An undeveloped piece of

10

property to the left going North toward Fish Haven was sold

11

to Gordon Reynolds for $5,000 when Merlin accepted a job in

12

Florida, in 19

13
14

—

Q

Okay.

How do you know how much that was sold

A

We paid, he used that $5,000 to finance the trip,

for?

15
ifi

a, the move to Florida when he accepted a job with European

17

Health Spa in 1971.

18

Q

19

Okay.

You told the Court there were two lots.

Are there now two lots (inaudible)?

20

A

When we moved back fro^i Florida in *74 we wanted

21

to repurchase that land and it was repurchased from Gordon

22

Reynolds for in excess of $20,000, to my knowledge.

23
24

25

j

Q

How do you know?

A

Merlin paid for it and he told me that he was

going to buy it back but it was going to cost him, cost us

50

Q

Is that sufficient?

Okay,

During the course of

your marriage when you would go up to this property what
would (inaudible).
A

There was always lots of work to be done, I

always cooked all the meals, washed all the dishes, cleaned
the cabin, tried to make it an enjoyable weekend for
everyone.

I weeded in the yard.

I eventually planted

flowers, scrubs, and things in the yard to make it more
beautiful. And then I took all the laundry home.

The

bedding and everything, the towels and all and washed
during the week while I was working.
Q

Okay.

Was this cabin for recreational purposes?

A

Yes, it was.

Q

Did people recreate there?

A

Oh, yes, yes.

Q

What did they do?

A

They went water skiing and jet skiing and sun

tanning and boating and played in the water.
Q

Okay.

Was there equipment there to do that?

A

Yes, there certainly was. Much equipment.

Q

Okay.

A

There were multiple boats. At one time there

Like what?

were, as I recall, at least five nice boats and that would
not include the sail boats nor the catamaran nor the
canoes.

There were also recreation vehicles.

56

himself out of the house.
A

There was an "L" shaped cut in the screen door

and he had reached through to a handle and I asked him to
replace the screen in the garage door or in the sliding
kitchen door which was done.
Q

And how long ago was that?

A

That was a few years back before he left the

house.
Q

Can you explain why you didnf t apply for other

jobs?
A

Because I needed to be with my husband to help

him keep a job and support him in keeping employment.

He

always asked me to come in and help him.
Q

Okay. And then counsel asked you if you thought

it was fair that you would get the house and Merlin would
get the cars and I think the pile of metal in the driveway.
What are you actually proposing?
A

The home has been my only source of security in

28 years. We have moved up and down.
MR. TYCKSEN:
responsive.

Objection, your Honor, non-

If she could just answer the question—

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
sustained.

It is has been my only source —

Just a moment.

The objection is

So counsel indicated to you what it is she

proposes and if you wish to get into the reasons you can

292

then ask her then.
MS. BEAN:

Maybe I'll ask her specific questions,

your Honor.
Q

(BY MS. BEAN)

Do you believe you have an

interest in the Bear Lake cabin?
A
marriage.
Q

Yes, the improvements during the time of the
I worked very hard up there.
Okay.

Do you believe that Mr. Symes had an

interest in the marital residence?
A

He's never wanted to live there.

Q

But a legal interest?

A

Probably.

Q

So, are you proposing that he keep the cabin and

you keep the house?
A

Yes, That would be in good interest to all.

Q

Okay. And you're also proposing that he keep his

cars, his boats, his jewelry, his toys?
A

Yes, I would want him to have those.

Q

All right. Are you in a position where you could

go live with one of your children?
A

No, I could not.

Q

Why not?

A

My children are renting. My children are not in

a good financial situation.
Q

I cannot —

Could you live with them if you rented your home?
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THE COURT:

Would you return to the witness

stand, please, Ma'am.
Q

(BY MR. TYCKSEN)

I believe on redirect

examination you said that you had been receiving Social
Security disability since 1993?
A

That is correct.

Q

And that you've been receiving more or less $390,

probably a little less earlier and it has gradually come up
to $390;

is that right?

A

That is correct.

It started out at just a little

over $300.
Q

What have you done with the $390 each month since

you've started receiving it?
A

Using it to pay bills, food, medicine, household

things totally.
Q

Where do you deposit that money?

A

It was deposited in my bank and sometimes the

checks were just cashed and I went and paid bills.
Q

Okay.

When did the bank statements that you had

in your home get stolen?
A

During, well, I noticed them during the course of

this last year.
Q

So when was the first time you noticed it?

A

I noticed it when I started cleaning out the

house because I had kept them in a specific bag for a
325

Q

In the past.

Let me hand you what has been

marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 26. And ask you if this
shows (inaudibles) any other time.

That's the insurance

document that's (inaudibles), correct?
A

This is a copy of the insurance on the cabin and

her name appears there and the reason why is because in
order to insure the cabin you have to have a permanent
residence that's insured also and then it's put on as like
an auxiliary.
Q

Okay.

A

And our home in Layton on Woodridge Drive is in

both of our names and consequently, I guess, if this is a
copy of the insurance for Bear Lake that's probably the
reason why her name's on it.

That would be the only reason

why her name would be on anything.
Q

Did you ever purchase a boat from your son,

Craig?
A

Did I ever purchase a boat from Craig?

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

A

No, I did not.

Q

Never?

A

Well, we talked about it last night but I

apparently suggested maybe he sell it to me but I never
received it. He sold it to someone else.
Q

Who did he sell it to?
364

denied access to all of his records.
injury.

He has a brain damage

He's subject to remembering what he can remember.

Ifve had to meet with him repeatedly to get answers to
those interrogatories.
THE COURT:

Well, if the interrogatories were in

August and we're now in October, that's two months ago and,
counsel, you recognize that those answers are to be filed
within 30 days and if indeed you need more time you could
have petitioned the Court and gotten a stipulation from
Plaintiff's counsel.

Correct?

MR. TYCKSEN:

I believe I had two weeks in the

hospital during that period of time and it was right about
the time they were due to be responded to and that's the
time when we had the last continuance and when I got back
to work I was overwhelmed with things.
practitioner.

I'm a sole

I did everything I could to get my client

and he was on vacation.

When he returned we worked at it

as fast as we could and last Friday I thought I was close
to having them finished.

He came in on Monday, we made

some additional changes, and on Tuesday he came back to
sign them and then I wasn't able to get them to her on
Wednesday.
THE COURT: And you have documentation to show
that title is in the name of someone other than defendant?
MR. TYCKSEN:

I do.

I have the deed and —
403
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